Cledara Revenue & Funding (2024)

[00:00] Quick context. This was recorded March twenty eighth and twenty ninth. So a couple weeks ago at my live event, saasopen.com. We had a thousand software CEOs there. If you missed it, we hope to see at the next one, September fifth and sixth in New York City, sasopen.com. But for now, let's jump into the recording. [00:18] >> We started flatlining on our pipe gen. So you can see that the changes that we made really did have an impact. Click through rates of get started free was nine times higher, nine times higher than Book a Demo. [00:34] Hey, folks. If we haven't met yet, my name is Nathan Latka. I launched and sold my first software company back in 2015 and went on to write a book about it, which you guys made a Wall Street Journal bestseller purchasing over 30,000 copies. Thank you so much for that. After the book, I launched this show and one went on to create founderpath.com. I raised a large fund to do non dilutive deals with b to b software [01:00] founders. So far, we've invested in over 400 software founders totaling a $150,000,000. Here in 2024, we're doing three to four new deals per week. So if you're looking for capital and don't wanna give up equity, go sign up at founderpath.com for free to get your offer. Alright. Let's jump into the interview. [01:19] >> And so what I'll talk about today is something we've never spoken about publicly before. We'll be talking about how we we changed our go to market and the decisions and inputs we had for that. And my hope today is that we all go back to the office on Monday and at least a, you've learned something, b, you sign up to cledara along the way, but c, you can use some of this in your own go to [01:43] >> market function. [01:45] >> So we changed our go to market very aggressively between Christmas and New Year last year. Right? So why did we do that? Well, first of all, we have a lot of data. Right? So we could see among our customers that were buying software through us how buyer behavior was was changing both at the initial purchase and the renewal. We could see how that was changing over time. So what we'll do what we'll talk about is how [02:14] >> we use that data, what we changed, how we approach pricing, how we approach packaging, how we align sales and marketing, and then how we brought that all together in in our sales team quotas and the buyer journey. [02:30] >> So hands up, who found last year challenging? Who felt like they got punched in the face? We've heard that before. Who got punched in the face a little bit last year? Yeah. Everyone's got their hands up and probably everyone else that didn't put their hands up is not being entirely truthful. So for us, you know, for a long time, PipeGen was easy. Right? PipeGen was something that just happened. People would book demos. People would respond to [02:57] >> our outbound. And we didn't need to think about it. It was it was like the air we breathed. It it just happened. And then last year, something interesting happened. We started flatlining on our pipe gen. Right? The the quota attainment was was dropping off as we were adding more SDRs. We were not booking necessarily more demos. We were being consistent. It wasn't going down. But I'm I wanted to double revenue last year, and I was wanted [03:26] >> to think about how we were going to double revenue again this year. And so a flat line didn't make me very, very excited. [03:33] >> And so what did we do? Right? How do what did we think about whilst this this section of the chart was was flat? What did we do to respond? So what we did was probably what a lot of companies did. We decided to widen our aperture. Right? Instead of just selling to our ICP, we said, you know what? The market's tough. It's especially tough for smaller companies. Let's go a little bit bigger. Right? We we had [03:58] >> companies that had come inbound to us that had several thousand employees. We're like, well, let's go see if we can generate more deals there as well as sell to our standard customer, 50 to 500 people. And, you know, what was interesting about it was though we did book opportunities with buyers of size and though we closed them, it didn't really have an impact on the total amount of pipeline we were we were booking. And so coming [04:23] >> into Christmas last year, we were thinking, okay. We've tried to go up market in addition to our SMB mid market. It's not got the results we wanted. Right? We're not having a chart that's going up into the right. We need to make a change. And you can see that last bar there. This is an index of our pipe generation from Q1 this year till about two days ago. So you can see that the changes that we [04:47] >> made really did have an impact and we'll be talking about it as we go through. So where did we start? We started by looking at our own data in our in our sales pipeline. So we saw pipe was good, not great. But the problem was when we started looking under the hood, there wasn't a lot to like. Right? Here's our average sales cycle. So for cledara, we were closing deals on average every took us thirty days, [05:15] >> more or less, since the beginning of time for us. Thirty days, we had the machine that got deals done. But as we widened that aperture, what happened was, well, we were working on deals that were a little less familiar. Right? So some of our AE's attention shifted away from the deals they could close quickly in in an environment we knew to finding ourselves selling to different personas with different objections, [05:42] >> you know, big buying committees that we'd never dealt with before. And look, this is probably not a surprise to anyone that runs revenue in this room, but that was not a place we wanted to be. We wanted our AEs to focus on deals that we could close in a predictable way. Interestingly, our win rate didn't change. It just took a lot longer and we had to work a lot harder for it. So that that that explosion [06:05] >> in our sales cycle was a a real wake up call. And what we decided to do was we needed to go one level deeper. We needed to look at more data to see what was happening and how we could use that to think about our strategy. So before I talk about the data we look at, I want to share where we get this data from. So I'd like you to all meet cledara. Cledara is a SaaS [06:27] >> management platform used by more than a thousand companies around the world to discover, buy, manage, and cancel the software they use to run their business. We save our customers a bunch of money. We save our customers a bunch of time. But really interestingly, it gives us probably the best real time view of SaaS buying that exists anywhere in the world. [06:51] >> We also get really deep data. So this is I'll quickly talk through this data here. But what this what this is is data from our onboarding process. So when we onboard a customer, the first thing that we want to do is understand what software they've got because you can't manage what you can't see. So when our customers deploy software, we get to see their entire software state whether they whether they know they've got that software or [07:19] >> not. And what you can see here is that more than 60% of companies have at least 40% of their software being stuff that IT, finance didn't know that they had. Right? Sales and finance sorry. Sales and marketing teams are are big offenders here. And so the point of sharing this is our data that we were using that we use between Christmas and New Year didn't just talk about the official buying processes that exist in companies. It [07:47] >> actually used the reality of what was happening in our customers, in their businesses, and in the market. [07:57] >> SaaS is everywhere. Right? SaaS is everywhere in businesses. I put this here mostly because I like this GIF. But to get the point across that we have a lot of data. So a thousand companies, 32 countries. In the last twelve months, our customers have purchased or renewed nearly three quarters of a million software subscriptions. If you're a SaaS company in this room, you sell software, chances are some or many of your customers use us to to [08:23] >> buy you. Our customers buy from more than 5,000 vendors. And every day, this provides us more than 2,000,000 data points about the real time state of the of the SaaS market. [08:37] >> So what do we do with all that data? And what did we do with that data to figure out how we should change our sales strategy? So one for anyone who follows us on our newsletter or on LinkedIn, you'll see us share data like this all the time. What this is is something we call the SaaS buyers index. And I'll quickly walk you through what this shows and then what we did about it. The SaaS buyers [09:01] >> index asks a very simple question. We look at one single company and we say, did they spend more on software this month than they did last month? If they spent more on software, we give them a score of 200. If they score if they spend less, we give them a score of zero. It's about the same we give them 100. Then we run that algorithm across every single company that buys software through us and average all [09:27] >> those zeros, one hundreds, and two hundreds. That means that if the the score becomes finishes up above 100 in any given month, it means the average company is increasing their software spend. Because below 100, it means they're decreasing. What you're what you're looking at here is that data segmented by the size of the buyer. Right? And segmented by the size of the buyer over time. So you can see the light blue line are smaller businesses. The [09:55] >> the bigger line are are bigger buyers of software. And you can see that until third quarter of twenty two, coincidentally, we raised our series a, markets were pretty good. Right? The the small buyers were buying software at a faster rate than than bigger companies that were increasing their spend more aggressively. And this feels intuitively right. When markets are good, buyers are smaller buyers, which are more volatile, perform better. Then markets got hard. Right? Markets got hard [10:27] >> last year in '23, and you see the dark line outperforming the the light blue line. What that meant was that bigger customers were bigger buyers of software were more reliable. And I think a lot of us found this in our businesses. Right? If we were selling to different customer segments, the bigger buyers seemed like a safer place to be. Many of our boards were probably telling us or our investors telling us to go up market. And [10:52] >> this data kind of supports it. Right? It says, 2023, sell to bigger customers, and you'll get better results. The interesting thing happened q three last year. So around web summit last year, we we gave us a state of the union on on SaaS. And we said, it's interesting. The small buyers come back. The small buyers started outperforming the big buyers for the first time in a long time. And those lines had just started crossing. What was [11:22] >> interesting about it is that for the rest of q four, that trend was was confirmed. So one thing to say here, and this is something that we we took heavily into our changing our go to market, was that if you did, if you haven't yet gone up market, if you've if you've seen through the VC winter, you're probably finding things a little bit easier right now. So you maybe don't be in a hurry to change. This [11:46] >> trend seems strong. Even this last line here is February this this year. March data is looking great as well. But this is one of the data points that had us consider what our go to market should be. The other thing we look at is [12:01] >> how do buyers behave between purchases of new software versus renewals? What this line is, it's a very simple ratio of the average spent on a renewal versus the average spent on a new software purchase. Right? And this is important because we see that buyers of software allocate 95% of their annual software budget to renewals, not new purchases. Right? So what's happening at the stage of renewal is is really important. What this shows is that buyers are [12:34] >> willing to spend on average 30% more for a renewal than a a new purchase. Now for us, this was interesting. It did raise a lot of questions though because there's a lot of ways you can interpret it. The two that we were thinking about was, well, this is these are partly vendors leaning into their customer base last year when it was tough to get new logos. But the other thing that we thought was, well, this actually [12:59] >> really validates in data the the land and expand approach to go to market. So if you can get your foot in the door, if you close a deal, there's the opportunity there to to increase your increase your revenue with that customer. So what do we do? So this was our pricing before we made the change. What you'll see is we had a relatively high entry price, especially for our smaller buyers. So the companies that were performing [13:26] >> better and buying more software were had a high entry point to to to Cloudera. The other thing that we we had is our product had grown over time. SaaS management was a challenging problem that affected finance and IT. And so we ended up with a lot of finance and IT features together in our plans. And so those complex buying committees that I was talking about earlier was happening all across the size spectrum for us. So this [13:55] >> was slowing slowing us down. [14:00] >> And, you know, that slowdown again, just to highlight it, caused that big ugly spike in our in our go to in our sales cycle. So what did we what did we do about it? So the first thing we did was we decided to overhaul our our pricing structure. So we looked at every single feature that we had and we took out everything that was for IT. We asked ourselves the question, how could we just sell to [14:25] >> one buyer And so we could deal with one one champion, one set of objections. We took out all the IT features, but they were valuable and they they help our customers a lot. So we shifted them to a set of add ons. And the interesting thing here for us was we felt that this gave us the opportunity to drive that expansion. Right? So for people that were already happy with our product and wanted to get more [14:50] >> value, we had a roadmap for them to do that that aligned with us getting more revenue from them in time. The other thing we had to do is we have a thousand customers that are all paying us something. Right? So we didn't want our existing customer base to be cannibalized. So the other thing you'll notice is we had to design our pricing such that if you got all the same features as you had before, you'd be [15:14] >> paying us the same. So the the pricing of the add ons and the pricing of the plans all ended up adding up to the the same place. [15:26] >> There we go. [15:29] >> The next thing we did so it wasn't just about pricing and packaging. We decided to go all in on conversion. So you would have seen on the previous slide, we added a free plan. Right? Our our churn is very, very low. So we believe that we can get a company even earlier than we would we would normally target them because we know that we add so much value that we can keep them forever and and grow [15:50] >> grow with them. But it wasn't just about our pricing and packaging. We decided to lean heavily into that free plan as a way to drive to drive interest and intrigue. So we decided to test different calls to action. Previously, our call to action was all about book a demo. Right? Now it's a new category. We've got a lot of buyer education to do. Getting a demo is really valuable for us. But who wants to give up [16:20] >> thirty minutes of their time to do discovery and and all these things and see a product? Why don't you just let someone start? So we tested different calls to action. We started one of the first ones we tested was get started free. And the interesting thing was the click through rate of get started free was nine times higher nine times higher than book a demo. Right? Even if get started free did end up and you taking [16:44] >> a demo before you saw the product, it still converted a lot better. The other the other thing that we had to think about was where else did that CTA appear? So it wasn't just on our website in the the top right. It wasn't just on our landing pages. We do outbound. So the CTA from all our SDRs doing outbound was driving people to a demo. We had them test, you know, get started free, and we noticed [17:11] >> a similar increase in conversion. So we that immediately helped our our pipeline. [17:20] >> And like I said, it didn't just touch our call to actions. It didn't just touch our pricing and packaging. It touched all the parts of our pipeline. So we're we're selling speed here. We want to deliver value really fast. And so we did wanted to make sure we didn't subject any of our prospects to that annoying thirty minute discovery call where we asked them questions. What we wanted to do was to make sure that we showed [17:42] >> them the demo on the first call. So we would we reduced our discovery to eight minutes. We embedded that in the in the demo call, and we just focused the demo on the pain points during that during the demo, the pain points that we identified during discovery. Our objective is to now drive a a one call close, even getting them to go through the sign up call, a sign up process with us whilst they're on the [18:05] >> call. We also are currently testing quotas. Right? So a lot of people here will do quotas around revenue, so dollars. We're testing driving quotas on logos. Right? Incentivizing that that speed and and driving urgency, and the initial results are really good. The idea is that we want to keep that momentum into our customer onboarding and reduce the time to value as much as possible. Again, these are types of behaviors that are well suited to that small [18:36] >> buyer that I I mentioned earlier. [18:39] >> So here's the result. So nearly tripled pipeline from one quarter to the next. Right? So how did we do that? We went all in on conversion. We focused on the buyers that were buying our product. But more importantly, we refocused. We were reminded that our ICP coincided with the type of buyer that was performing well at this time. Good reminder as well that whilst there's a lot of received wisdom in driving go to market and software [19:05] >> companies, Actually, lot of it's true. But if you back it up with data, you can make changes very, very quickly. [19:14] >> So a couple of quick key takeaways. If you've heard the SMB is dead, I can tell you it ain't. It's doing really well right now. But you've got to make it easier to buy. And my challenge to you is how easy can you make it to buy? Pricing and packaging, it's the biggest leader you've probably got. Right? This is the first thing the first thing that everyone tries to find out. They the buyer is looking to [19:36] >> qualify you out as much as you're looking to qualify them, and pricing is a big way to do this. And so if you feel like things are slowing down, do look at your pricing, but also your packaging because you've got a lot of leaders there. And do whatever you can to simplify that process. So if you can remove people from the buying committee by changing your pricing and packaging, you've you've got a big you've got a [20:00] >> big opportunity to accelerate pipeline a lot. So thank you very much. This data we publish quarterly. And so if you would like that data, the QR code there will allow you to to download it and we'll sign you up and you'll get this data in your inbox every every three months. Thank you very much.

so guys before we jump in out of curiosity um I want you guys to just think real quick in your head how much do you think you're going to spend this year on all your software expenses just think about it in your head how much do you think you're going to spend on all your software expenses now at founder path we average about 27 000 per employee per year just on software expenses and you guys are gonna have a better number than I am but I want you guys on the count of three to yell out what your number is your total software expense you think you're going to spend this year all your software HubSpot everything right one two three so an average of about 1.63 million is what I heard there you go um what is it what do people spend on average per year on software or maybe is it per head on software so I only our customers spend about 15 50 and 100 000 a month on software and is that is that could you give us like a per capita versions like per head what's the average software company spend per year on software do you know perhaps it would be hard to say because our our customers have somewhere between you know 50 people to 800 people so 50 days it's hard to say yes well Christina's story is really impressive they were so gracious to host me and Alex and the whole SAS stock crew this must have been a year and a half about a year ago about a year ago and beautiful Barcelona and then I'm going uh for Christmas to spend it with my mom in Loveland and I was pinging them and Brad goes I'm in Colorado and I said well let's hang out so they're now opened an office in Denver and so what we want to focus on today a lot of folks at the beginning of today raised your hand when we said who's not from the states and so I thought a really valuable use of time would be how did you guys move from not the states to now very much in the states whether that's Denver or I hear maybe New York happening so we want to talk about that um and then also talk about how you guys managed to get a 20 million dollar series a done in September now you guys have to remember markets were sort of crashing into of equity way before September so we're going to hear all the ways how many times did the deal almost die well I can tell you that we started fundraising in March when everything was starting to go on a downturn we had to pause because that way nobody is going to do anything at this point in time until we figure out what's going on with uh the tech sector and uh and in the end yes so it uh it took us about all those months that they were so you can't take um but how I would say I mean it was very painful like I can't tell you that it was very very cool people don't realize that they think oh you know you get some investors you get a term sheet you do two weeks of diligence on your clothes these things will die 100 dimes uh you think you're about to sign then it dies you think the sign dies so just to be clear when you say in March you had to pause did you have a sign term sheet that thing got pulled and you had to re come back to it no so we started the fundraising March okay we are going to send emails to investors and then nobody was moving everything was like okay maybe we speak in a month so maybe we schedule something for you know in in a few weeks and then we realize okay that's just not going to move forward and what we did is okay what can we do well we just need to make sure we continue growing in the end you know last year we grew 5x so okay markets weren't good but we were growing really fast and the reality is that then some of those investors that had seen that had heard from us in March and then we started fundraising again in June I think right after Europa I remember I was in one of these chats and had a brilliant idea to kind of mention to Eleanor from sifted yeah we're gonna start fundraising uh in a couple of weeks and uh but then yeah then it went very quickly right because people had seen what we were in March very clearly and then they saw what we were by June when we restarted and in September it was all done and it's very important I think you guys have expanded geographically is just a great story but I want people to really perk up and listen and understand are they at your stage are they further than you are they behind you so they they can listen to you with that context so to the extent that you can like how many folks are full-time on the team today would you say in the whole company is uh 80 people 80 people and how many are only us so the moment in the U.S we have seven and when we started selling into the us we actually had nobody in the US so when we were thinking okay we want to expand here and uh obviously I love the risking whatever I can the risk and we knew that the same problem existed here companies buy SAS companies spend on sales waste on size and when we started having conversations from the team in London very quickly we saw okay that is you know the problem exists but until we have sales we are not going to have a somebody on the ground and we waited until we had about 50 customers who sold the first US cup did you get who sold the first U.S customer and what was the average ACV the first Year's customer I think was right how much was it for do you remember size we're talking 500 bucks 500 bucks a month okay so 6 6K ACV was the first sale yes and uh is Brad still sawing in the US today or no is Brad still the lead sales guy in the US today or have you replaced him we I mean he still does a lot but we've replaced it yet now we have uh Bradley actually so similar name uh but we did we did hire somebody else here um and but yeah so it says we just wanted to make sure that there was a real opportunity here we just didn't want to do what some companies you know there are different strategies some companies send the landing team and they try to expand uh directly from here and we took the approach of okay let's test it from from the UK we know what good looks like for us and then as long as it's more or less there we'll we'll do it and we we then yeah in September after our series day we decided to open the office in Denver so we'll get more into the Denver story here in a second but with 80 folks full-time most private SAS companies today that do have VC funding will do somewhere like around 130 000 in Revenue per employee would you guys say you're sort of in that I'll put you between like nine and 20 million in ARR he's sort of in that range today we are close to that ranges the bottom or the top part of that range the bottom okay cool but growing nicely you mentioned 5x past 12 months which is great so why Denver how did you run this process so we were exploring San Francisco New York Denver and Austin at the time people told us don't come to San Francisco that was about uh 18 months ago uh New York was very expensive and also people were telling us no people don't want to come to the city anymore I don't think that's true the city it's great so you're feeling and I can tell you're loving New York I do love New York um and then between Austin and San Francisco when I was talking to people in Austin what I realized is everybody was saying oh we are here for a couple of years and then we'll go back to whatever we we are from um and that for me when I'm looking to create a team I want teams that are relatively stable and we know that people like to move people like to explore new job opportunities but I was making sure that okay we can create a stable team so that we don't lose all that knowledge constantly and then also in Denver you have great universities great Engineers a lot of tech companies have second offices there and you also have a lot of great companies that are born there so that's what led us to to Denver and I love skiing so you know I love skiing I love skiing so you know for me that was another bonus very cool how many so raise your hand if you are based in Europe or some not in the US and you and you already have at least one FTE in the U.S anybody okay okay cool okay this is great so I'm gonna throw it over to you guys so Bridget you have any questions for Christina in terms of U.S expansion hardest thing about U.S expansion people like finding people in us or like you're talking about people location everything for me when we were starting the hardest thing was just that things are actually very different like just from the way in which you contract people the way in which you pay people the way the things that are like the what people expect when when you are interviewing then also the from a product perspective the bar is much higher here right like people really want more uh they're also willing to pay more right so that's something that I think as Europeans we need to take into consideration that sometimes we come with our European product and our European pricing and we're just undermining ourselves will you sell the same product in the uh to the US customers YouTubers like you charge the US customer double no actually what we've learned is that we just can't raise it in both markets and the value is there and I think that's the other thing that we've realized that or personally I've realized I think sometimes as Founders we we see the let's say the Complete product in our minds and with your okay it's not fully there therefore the full value is not there but actually the value is there people are paying for it and with now this year double prices or we've increased prices twice and we still don't see uh any pushback during sales calls wow so one of the things with your permission you can reject this is no problem but when I met with Brad in Denver I had no idea your business model was what it actually is uh because I interview companies that do what you do all the time and many of them are not doing well because it's effectively an agency that's negotiating contracts and then they go out of business a year later that is not your model it's very different are you open to sharing how you guys make actually make money yeah yeah absolutely so we we have a fintech product embedded into the into our Solutions so essentially we are a an uh what we do is we provide companies with the with a process for their businesses which starts with helping you assess what you should buy then paying actually paying for the software through our platform so we provide you with the virtual cards to pay for it or you can initiate the transfer through us and then we enable you the ongoing management so how many licenses do you need or how uh who needs access and we provide visibility to the whole business so then we do we have two revenue streams one is the subscription uh to access the platform and then the other one is The Interchange Revenue that gets paid to us directly from MasterCard and here's what shocked me what percent of your monthly revenue is interchange versus 60 is interchange and 40 is uh SAS sixty percent is interchange so raise your hand if you know what interchange means so okay some people do okay this is like this whole model of SAS Plus in my opinion like it makes it way more sticky I imagine way more valuable I'm curious how your Equity investors reacted to this when you originally pitched them and they saw this growing interchange but explain how this works so I'm a company I'm processing x amount of dollars through every month how do you make money on that so the customer doesn't pay anything and that's the beauty of it right so whenever you pay for something with your card there is a percentage that the acquirer takes and then of that percentage uh the majority comes to the issuer which in this case is us and so it's something that the customer doesn't feel at all like you don't feel like you are paying a percentage on top to us but we get it directly from the card schemes and when you add up the total sort of GMB right cost volume going through kadara on a monthly basis today where what range is that in so so I can tell you that this year we're gonna do half a billion so 500 million dollars in you helping software companies buy other software yeah and when you look at interchange is the is it a debit or credit uh in the UK and in Europe is David and in the US is credit I'm going to try and simplify this because when we go in the Weeds on this stuff there's and anyone in here who isn't anyone in here in the credit card gmv margin space okay yeah so you're all smiling you're going okay this is gonna be hard to explain because it is it's very hard to understand who's the issuing Bank who's the issuer is there a project manager who's coming in bond is a great sponsor that also plays in this space um most people would say that the max interchange you can make uh you know top line on a debit product in the states would be something around 2.6 percent and ultimately depending on if you have a program manager or not you cladora or if whoever's helping the processing you could end up with net interchange of something at like 1.8 to 2 then every the other 0.6 gets taken by the you know Banks the other folks help me understand how you guys negotiated those margins because if you're doing 500 million bucks in volume 0.1 extra is a big deal yes so I mean we negotiate quite high up so we are very close to say that again you never what like we keep the majority of of that percentage so on that I think we've uh we've done great negotiations with our partners there uh because as you say Obviously a small percentage when you talk about these figures it's meaningful so did you guys use a program manager when you launched this who did you use so we actually worked with bond in the US and uh we work with rails are in UK and Europe and how does Bond work how do you work with Bond so we integrate with them and then we programmatically create the virtual cards that we that we need from them just a little product placement they're a good sponsor you know I figured I'd teed that up pretty organically I love I love why not go for the kill you know there you go Bond we'll get that recording for you um but okay so okay so that's the model today so is that how you go from nine million a year in Revenue to 100 million year in Revenue it's going from 500 million one volume to 5 billion in volume or are there other revenue streams we don't know about yet that there is more of course there is always more so with the with us we so at the moment what we're doing if you can think of cladora is we are aggregating the demand side of uh software right so we are creating a very powerful platform to help businesses buy software and with that we are learning a lot around what uh companies use what they use alongside it when they churn what do they churn to and this is all uh information obviously that vendors find very useful we don't share it at the moment that's not something that we're doing but it is true that in all these conferences whenever you know vendors come to us they say hey do you have a Marketplace can we be part of your Marketplace we want to be able to get your customers to find us more easily so what we've started doing is create what we call the Discover feature uh which is essentially if you're trying to buy um CRM we will say okay as a company you are you have this profile and programmatically we will tell you what are the top three crms that companies like you are buying today so that's uh something that we are that we are now testing it's being very successful and then obviously we will just open it up more in a Marketplace form and can you irrigate your G2 model where people can pay for paid placement at the top of the recommendation list or no so we want to we on that we are very clear we always want to be on the side of the buyer so therefore we would only ever recommend something that our that we see that based on how customers use it makes sense for you so it would always be like based on on usage very cool before I'm going to throw it over to you guys for questions here in a second over the last minute but how much do you think you guys will grow this year minimum 3x minimum 3x I love it all right minimum 3x all right we got a minute left look what raise your hand if you've got a question I already got a question throw one at her she said so many oh yeah sorry sorry I told Christina I want to do something different uh so if you're here for the Four B's you got to catch her outside but what are the four give us the four P's real quick and then they can talk to you off stage about it yeah so that the front piece are so when whenever something goes you know maybe not to plan what I always turn to is what can I control what are the things that I can really influence what can I focus on so it's pricing is product and positioning and instant planning internally in the company and whenever things don't you see that you know the market is throwing tons of things at you okay but I I know I can control this so let's make sure that we optimize on those ones for the current conditions that we are handling but they're happy to speak to anybody uh that wants to uh about it and and then maybe one final thing right so um you mentioned you know about the claddara and and how you know what's what's there for us and um in the future but something super interesting our customers today spend or are renewing or buying 1500 subscriptions a day wow like this is two different customers both are buying HubSpot do you count that as two or one that's one customer buying hotspot but when you say they're buying 1500 different like skus uh so HubSpot would be one skew what do you mean when you say all your customers are buying 1500 different softwares per day did I hear that right yes would you count like if two different customers both pay for HubSpot is that exactly no that's still that would be two yeah okay okay yeah yeah okay so there are a lot of different uh yeah people buying software and really software every single day all right so this makes us the biggest software management platform I think in the world of the woman in terms of volumes there you go so guys I mean this is impressive lunch several years ago gonna process half a billion dollars in volume this year and not your average spend management system they're very smart in terms of how they're doing it building the business model now 80 people full time with a bunch of folks in the states there's an office in Denver there's a marketplace coming she hooks to 3x this year please give it up for Christina from kodara thank you thank you so much after you please [Applause]