Jane Hit $4.7M ARR With No Sales Team. The 2025 Row Says $100M.
In 2018 Alison Taylor called Jane's fit with allied-health clinics “perfect” and defined the word as her customers having nowhere else to go. Seven years of dated rows are the test of that claim.
On this page
Alison Taylor made sure the developer building her software charged her enough to resent her.
It was 2011. She was opening a multidisciplinary clinic in Canada — physio, chiro, massage, naturopath and osteo under one roof — and the friend doing her branding and her website had agreed to build the online booking and electronic charting system she could not find anywhere on the market. Everything she had tried was, in her words, horrific. She insisted on paying him, and on paying enough that the arrangement had teeth.
I did say you have to charge me enough that I can be a pain in the ass client.
The bill came to something like $30,000. He built the first version in about six weeks. Taylor ran it for a year on a Mac Mini in her own clinic, and the entire market research behind the company was the handful of clinic owners who saw her online booking page, liked it, and asked what they were looking at. “That was our full market research,” she said. “We did like half a dozen clinics.” Seven years later that software was Jane, and Taylor sat down with Nathan Latka to describe a business at $4.7 million in ARR that had never taken a dollar of outside money.
The tape carries no date on its face, but the content puts it in the spring of 2018. Taylor talks about March 2017 as last year’s comparison, about a full year just spent rebuilding the software for U.S. insurance, about the team’s first American trade show as having happened last week, and about a competitor’s move off its free model as something that had just changed the market. GetLatka captured the interview on 21 May 2018, and the $4.7 million revenue row carries that same date.
The argument. Taylor used the word “perfect” twice in the first two minutes, and when Latka pushed her on how she measured it, her answer was not about the software at all. It was about the market she had picked: a tier of health practice the software industry had skipped, where her customers had nowhere else to go. Jane’s product-market fit was a market-selection claim, and seven years of dated rows are the only real test of one.
“Perfect” meant nowhere else to go
Latka opened on churn, because in software sold to very small businesses churn is usually the wound. Taylor said Jane’s was under five percent. He made her define it — logo or revenue, net or gross, monthly or annual — and she held the number through every narrowing: revenue churn, gross, annual, under five percent.
We’ve had perfect market fit and a really amazing customer service, and we don’t have any sales staff.
Asked how she knew, she gave the most literal possible answer.
There is no churn, so there’s nothing else that they’re going to.
Alison Taylor, co-founder, Jane
That is a statement about supply, not about delight. Jane sells to allied health — physiotherapists, chiropractors, massage therapists, naturopaths, osteopaths — the tier below the MDs and GPs that every practice-management vendor was already courting. Those practitioners, Taylor said, were very much ignored by the software industry in general, and had been making do with tools designed for doctors. She was one of them first: she opened the practice, hated the options, and became customer number one of the product built to fix it.
Three denominators, one revenue number
Jane’s pricing is per practitioner licence. The base price was $74 a month; the average customer was paying about $95. Latka multiplied 18,000 by $95, got $1.7 million a month, and put it to her. Taylor corrected him, and the correction is the most useful thing on the tape for anyone trying to model this kind of business.
18,000 users, we lumped together part-time practitioners, so a lot of our practitioners will work like one day a week or two days a week.
Three counts get confused in practice-management software, and Jane’s tape has all three in the same five minutes.
- Practitioners — 18,000 of them, all paying, no free trial, because Taylor thinks an empty trial account is a bad first experience and Jane migrates customers’ data for them.
- Clinics — over 550 in the United States alone at the time of the interview, each one an account with several practitioners on it.
- Customers — the billing relationship, averaging about $95 a month, with part-timers bundled onto a single licence rather than each paying full freight.
Reconciled, the number Taylor gave was $4.7 million in ARR, roughly $390,000 a month. Latka ran the implied revenue per practitioner — about $22 a month — against the $40 acquisition cost she had quoted, and got a payback period of two months. She agreed it was about right.
Payback = CAC ÷ monthly revenue per practitionerLatka’s arithmetic on tape: $40 against about $22 a month. Taylor confirmed the shape of it; the $22 is derived, not a figure she volunteered.
The $40 bought trade-show booths, not ads. Jane had done association events in Canada, the UK and Australia, and the U.S. one only the week before the interview — a trip the team had bundled with a visit to Stripe about a payment-processing partnership, because, as Taylor put it, a conference is R&D as much as marketing when the founders are the ones working the booth. She pegged revenue growth at 105 percent the year before the interview and again the year before that — her own figure, given with an “I think” attached — and the goal for the year in progress was to double once more.
The year the market handed her the U.S.
Canada was never going to be big enough. Taylor had spent the previous year rebuilding Jane to handle American insurance, which works differently from the Canadian kind, and she was blunt about the stakes: “This is the play. If it doesn’t work in the US our TAM is just too small. Like, all of Canada is the size of California.” A lifestyle business was the alternative, and she said so.
Then two things happened that she had not paid for.
An ad-supported incumbent, which Taylor said marketed primarily to MDs, moved to a paid model. Allied-health practitioners who had been using doctor software because nothing else existed suddenly had a reason to look around.
Named on tape as Practice Fusion“There’s another competitor that shut down completely,” Taylor said, “and so all of a sudden we’re getting all of these people jumping on board.”
Because the U.S. billing work had shipped the year before, Jane could absorb the arrivals instead of watching them. Taylor put the acceleration at about six months ahead of plan.
Over 550 U.S. clinics landed on a company doing no American marketing at all. What Jane had instead was invisible to it: “It’s just word-of-mouth growth. So we’re in Facebook groups and people just talk about us. We don’t even see it, it’s kind of invisible to us.” Her stated worry was not competition. It was that growth would arrive faster than the company could staff for it.
“We’ve never had a zero cash date”
Jane was profitable, reinvesting everything, and still behind. The team had just hired eight people that month, putting it at about 36, and Taylor said it needed to be at 50 by the end of the year. Everyone was in Canada except one contractor in Nashville. There was a million dollars unspent in the budget, deliberately, so the company could hire ahead of the training curve.
This is a problem being bootstrapped: is that you make more money and that money is used to pay for more staff.
She was getting roughly six investor emails a day and had taken a call with Bessemer without knowing who Bessemer was. Her reason for saying no was not ideology; it was a piece of vocabulary she had only recently learned.
You take investment and then all of a sudden you have a date where you’re gonna run out of money because you’re spending more than you make.
$0outside capital raised as of the interview, spring 2018
Taylor’s objection to venture money was that it makes whatever is already happening happen faster, in both directions, and nothing about Jane in 2018 needed to be faster. She joked about the press release nobody writes: “We should do a press release: Jane raised 0 dollars.” Latka promised to make it the headline.
The seven-year test
What the rows say happened next
An interview about product-market fit is a prediction, and this one is old enough to score. GetLatka’s revenue rows for Jane run from the tape forward: $4.7 million recorded May 2018, $25 million recorded October 2022 — flagged in the database as an estimate, so treat it as a marker rather than a measurement — and $100 million recorded April 2025.
Headcount tracks the same arc. The team of 36 Taylor described in May 2018 is 168 in a row dated 1 January 2021, 256 dated 1 January 2022, 315 dated 1 January 2023, and 340 by July 2023, unchanged in a row dated October 2024. The January dates are the importer’s bucket for a figure given for that whole year, so read them as the year, not the day.
The breakdown is where the 2018 tape gets contradicted in the most interesting way. Jane had no sales staff when Taylor said the words. By July 2023 the rows show 32 people in sales and 12 in marketing — against 116 engineers, up from 84 in a row dated 1 January 2022. The company built a sales function, and still kept it small enough that engineering outnumbers sales and marketing combined by better than two to one. One caution for anyone reading the company profile: the customer count on it, 18,000, and the $40 acquisition cost are the same numbers Taylor gave on the podcast. They are 2018 figures that were never refreshed, not current ones.
The $602 million line, read row by row
The total-funding figure on Jane’s row today is $602 million, against a valuation of $1.8 billion. That is a startling thing to find on a company whose founder said zero, on tape, with feeling. It is worth reading the three rows that make it up rather than the sum, because they are not the same kind of event.
- January 2019 · $2M described as debt financing, sourced to CB Insights — venture debt, not equity, and eight months after the interview.
- 1 January 2021 · $100M sourced to CB Insights, carrying no round label, no investor and no valuation. The date is the importer’s year bucket, so it means 2021, not New Year’s Day.
- 26 May 2025 · $500M the row that carries the $1.8 billion valuation. Its source is a BetaKit report that Jane Software would be valued at $1.8 billion in an upcoming secondary financing.
The three add to exactly the $602 million on the company row, which is worth saying plainly: the total is a sum of these entries, one of them debt and one of them sourced to a report about a secondary financing. A secondary moves existing shares between holders rather than putting new money on the balance sheet, and the source describes the deal as upcoming and the valuation as reported. The row does not say who sold or what closed, so neither will this post. What can be said is narrower and still remarkable: a company that raised nothing for its first seven years is now carried at $1.8 billion with $100 million of revenue recorded against it, and the largest line on its funding ledger points at a transaction in the company’s shares, not a growth round it needed to survive.
Which is roughly what Taylor said she was building toward, when Latka asked why she kept turning the money down.
We’re not growing a huge business for an exit. We’re growing a business to be a sustainable responsible business that provides a great service.
Sources Alison Taylor’s interview with Nathan Latka, recorded spring 2018; GetLatka company, metrics and funding rows for Jane, dated in the text; funding rows sourced by GetLatka to CB Insights (January 2019, 2021) and BetaKit (May 2025).
